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Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD) in developing countries 
has rapidly grown in significance since it first entered the agenda of the international climate 
change negotiations in 2005. Despite slow progress of the international negotiations on a global 
post-2012 climate agreement, REDD has become a mechanism that links 15 developed and approx. 
50 developing countries: developed countries act as donors, bilaterally or multilaterally channelling 
funds to developing countries to establish and implement forest preservation projects. This 
investment has the potential to reduce greenhouse gas emissions significantly. In addition REDD, if 
implemented effectively, has a positive impact on sustainable development at large, biodiversity 
conservation and poverty eradication. 
However, despite clear progress in the general set-up of the REDD mechanism uncertainties and 
contested issues remain. Particularly important is the uncertainty as to the outcome of REDD; it is 
too early to judge whether REDD will be successful. This is relevant when it comes to the financing 
of REDD, which is dependent on financial transfers from donor countries. But there seems to be 
reluctance amongst developed countries to engage in REDD, which is attached to these 
uncertainties. This paper focuses on the influence of uncertainty on the framing of REDD in three 
selected donor countries, namely Norway, Germany and Canada. 
This paper argues that despite increasing scientific evidence available on REDD the specific 
uncertainty concerning the outcome effects the framing of REDD in industrialised countries acting 
as donor countries. The framing of REDD varies accordingly, ranging between a climate change 
mitigation mechanism, development aid tool or simply economic benefits/burdens. Hence this has a 
particular influence on the institutional set-up within these countries and the decision-making 
process.  
2 Introduction 
Uncertainty is a frequently occurring, complex concept, defined in various 
ways. What is commonly understood of uncertainty is that the prediction of the 
outcome is largely impossibly. In particular political science deals with 
scientific uncertainty. It is suggested that scientific uncertainty poses immense 
challenges for policymakers, who derive legitimacy from demonstrating their 
capacity to take swift decisions and convey confidence about their decision-
making premises. An increase of scientific evidence and knowledge of a certain 
issue is generally expected to decrease the degree of uncertainty.  
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+)1 
derived as a concept from intensified scientific research on forests and 
deforestation and became an important climate change mitigation mechanism, 
discussed at the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change 
                                                 
1 Although the + is not suffixed throughout this paper the importance it adds to REDD, including the role 
of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest stocks in developing 
countries, is acknowledged and implied if not explicitly stated differently. 
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(UNFCCC) in 2007. A growing amount of literature have featured an increase 
of knowledge on REDD, which has also led to further fragmentation of its 
simple core idea that by protecting forests, global greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions can be significantly as well as potentially very cost-effectively 
reduced ( cf. Eliasch, 2008; IPCC 2007; Stern 2006;). However, many contested 
aspects and uncertainties remain. In particular this refers to uncertainties of 
what the overall effectiveness, meaning the long-term outcome of REDD may 
be and whether/when we will see any GHG emission reduction results as well 
as uncertainty of future costs and financing options for REDD.  
These aspects are significant for the survival of the mechanism at large and 
relevant for all actors involved in REDD, developed and developing countries 
alike. Outside the UNFCCC we see a new regime and a colorful REDD 
landscape emerging, shaped by the knowledge contribution and engagement of 
a variety of actors. Most importantly, however, 15 developed countries act as 
donors, bilaterally or multilaterally channeling funds to approx. 50 developing 
countries. Engagement of donors is currently a premise for survival: Without 
their financial support no REDD mechanism would exist. But with uncertainty 
attached to REDD and no obvious benefit, why do developed countries engage 
and become donors? Incentives for engagement should be linked to the most 
important deliverable of REDD: quantifiable, reduced GHG emissions.  
In the light of uncertainty concerning deliverables of REDD, this paper argues 
that uncertainty creates a scope of action. It is assumed that actors (in this case 
developed countries acting as donors) purposefully utilize uncertainty of 
REDD. The overarching question is: How does an actor utilize uncertainty and 
why? A model for assessing how uncertainty is utilized is developed consisting 
of three factors: Actor-constellation, agenda-setting and economic capacity. 
Before these factors are explained in detail, followed by an application of the 
model to the case of Norway – where uncertainty is identified as a motor for 
progress – and a discussion on whether / how the model can be applied to 
Germany and Canada to compare all three cases adequately, the paper begins 
by outlining knowledge construction on REDD. 
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3 Constructing Knowledge on REDD 
Scientific evidence on the importance of forests can be identified as the 
overarching driver for the conceptualization of REDD. Forests act as giant 
utilities providing vital ecosystem services to the world including water 
storage, rainfall generation, climate buffering, biodiversity conservation and 
soil stabilization (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). Forests also 
directly underpin the livelihoods of more than 1.6 billion people (World Bank, 
2004); the majority of the world’s poor and marginalized continue to be found 
in rural regions (Millennium Project, 2005: 16-17). Maintaining intact forest 
ecosystems will enable societies to adapt to the worsening impacts of climate 
change (CBD & GTZ, 2009).  
Emission from deforestation is the second largest source of global GHG 
emissions. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007) has 
estimated that annual forest loss accounts for approximately 17 per cent of 
global GHG emissions. The British Stern Review (Stern 2006) confirmed this 
and attributed financial benefits to the reduction of deforestation; the review 
noted that avoided deforestation could be one of the most economical ways to 
reduce climate change. This was further elaborated by the Eliasch Review 
(2008), where the economic benefits of halving deforestation was attributed 
with up to 3.7 trillion USD savings in the long term. Hence reducing 
deforestation was suddenly perceived as a significant and potentially cost-
effective option for reducing global GHG emissions whilst helping smooth the 
transition to a low-carbon economy (Eliasch, 2008). These scientific findings 
constructed a new knowledge base upon which various actors nationally and 
internationally began to look for policy options to deal with deforestation and 
the loss of carbon sinks. To attach the carbon stored in forests with an economic 
value and hence create financial and market incentives for developing countries 
to protect their tropical forests seemed appealing to many. Despite remaining – 
as well as newly occurring – uncertainties, decision-making on REDD is 
actively enforced. 
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3.1 Decision-making on REDD under uncertainty 
Scientific uncertainty is relatively often addressed in political science and in 
particular in the analysis of political processes (cf. Jamieson, 1996). Scientific 
uncertainty can be seen “not as a lack of scientific understanding but as the lack 
of coherence among competing scientific understandings” (Sarewitz, 2004: 386). 
Additionally, the same data set can be interpreted in different ways, which can 
produce ambiguity (cf. Wynne, 2001). In fact, Klinke and Renn (2002: 1085) 
argue that most disputes about uncertainty are dependent on different 
interpretations of what the same data means for society. These interpretations 
or framings can in turn result in diverging recommendations for political 
action. But how exactly do actors deal with uncertainty attached to REDD? For 
the purpose of this paper uncertainty is defined as lack of knowledge about 
effectiveness and costs of REDD.  
3.1.1 International agenda-setting of REDD 
The role of forests and other biocarbon sinks in the climate change regime has 
been amongst the most contentious issues. During the earlier negotiations of 
the Kyoto Protocol, the role of forest sinks divided the environmental 
community (Fearnside, 2001). It nearly ruined the UNFCCC Conference of the 
Parties (COP) in 2000 and forced an extraordinary session (“COP6-bis”) in early 
2001 (Niles, 2002; Wirth, 2002). What is now known as REDD was initiated 
through a proposal by the governments of Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica 
in alliance with some other parties at COP-11 in Montreal in 2005. The 
proposal, originally focusing only on reducing emissions from deforestation 
(RED), was presented as one of the most essential means to achieve the target of 
limiting the global temperature rise to 2°C and to effectively deal with 
deforestation and the loss of carbon sinks. The Parties received widespread 
support for their proposal and a contact group was established to explore 
options for REDD.  
The concept grew further to include forest degradation (REDD), and was then 
developed into a mechanism which adds the role of conservation, sustainable 
management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks (REDD+) 
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(Minang et al., 2009). This broad definition enshrined in REDD+ was adopted 
by the COP in the Bali Action Plan in 2007 and is since negotiated at the 
UNFCCC. Including deforestation in the climate regime has provided an 
opening for the active participation of developing countries in emission 
reduction efforts under an international climate change regime (cf. Dutschke & 
Wolf, 2007). However, only the quick-start financing offered by developed 
country Parties enabled REDD to receive a widespread significance. Norway 
was the first country to make financial commitments to the REDD mechanism 
at COP-13 in Bali, where Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg pledged up to three 
billion Norwegian Kroner (NOK) annually for REDD-related projects. This 
pledge made Norway the first developed country to include REDD as a climate 
change mitigation mechanism in its climate policy. Norway took the lead on 
REDD and began to shape the mechanism. Hence the financial commitment 
aimed at spurring further development and further commitment by other 
actors. This commitment seemed to go unaffected by the existing uncertainties.  
3.1.1.1 The current status of REDD at UNFCCC level 
At COP-16 in Cancun in 2010 all Parties formally recognized the important role 
of forests in climate change mitigation (UNFCCC, 2010: III.C). As deforestation 
was excluded from the Kyoto Protocol, policy negotiations on REDD have 
mainly been carried out through the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term 
Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA) (cf. ibid.). Another COP 
forum for REDD negotiation has become the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice (SBSTA). This has focused on adopting guidance for a 
Safeguard Information System (SIS) on how safeguards are implemented and 
considered in REDD, and also examined the question of reference levels and 
reference emission levels for REDD. The AWG-LCA affirmed that “Parties 
should collectively aim to slow, halt and reverse forest cover and carbon loss, 
according to national circumstances, consistent with the ultimate objective of 
the Convention” (ibid.: III.C. preamble). One implication concerns financing. 
The AWG-LCA pledged long-term financing for mitigation, including REDD, 
of 100 billion USD annually by 2020, though there is ambiguity on the type of 
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funding mechanisms that will be used to achieve this (ibid.: IV.A.para.98). The 
AWG-LCA states that “funds provided to developing country Parties may 
come from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and 
multilateral, including alternative sources” (ibid: IV.A.para.99). This is reflected 
in the approach delivered in the Meridian Report, prepared in 2009 for the 
Government of Norway to support the development and implementation of 
REDD. It suggests combining fund-based and market-based elements, also 
including capacity building. This three-phased approach was adopted by the 
international community at COP-16 to establish a REDD mechanism.  
 1st Phase (Preparation and Readiness): Focus on capacity building, 
preparation for governance reforms in developing countries; stakeholder 
engagement and the building of a national strategy to address drivers of 
deforestation prior to the implementation of any REDD policies. 
 2nd Phase (Policies and Measures): Builds a national policy framework for 
the implementation of REDD and links it to other sectors such as 
agriculture, energy and development. 
 3rd Phase (performance-based payments): Links implementation of REDD 
activities to performance-based payments (emission reduction targets).  
The current funding structure is closely connected to the three-phased 
approach; funding for REDD activities comes mainly from public sources, 
predominantly Official Development Assistance (ODA), contributed by the 15 
donor countries. It is channeled bilaterally or via multilateral institutions to 
developing countries to implement forest preservation projects. So far three 
major multilateral funding initiatives have been established to support a global 
REDD mechanism; UN-REDD Programme, Forest Carbon Partnership Facility 
and Forest Investment Program (FIP), and some significant national and 
regional initiatives, such as the Congo Basin Fund, the Amazon Fund and 
Norway’s National Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI). Climate Funds 
Update data reports that USD 570 million was approved for REDD projects 
between 2008 and February 2011, financing a total of 139 projects.2 This equals 
to about 15.5 per cent of total climate finance but does not come anywhere near 
to the proposed financial resources estimated in the Eliasch Review. 
                                                 
2 http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/projects; accessed 21.02.2012 
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3.1.2 Framing REDD 
How do people form preferences? This is a relevant question for a lot of research in 
political science. Druckman (2010) explains framing by looking at the “variable 
of ultimate interest: an individual’s preference” (280). Preferences over 
objectives derive from comparative evaluations of those, often alternative, 
objects. Hence frames are often used in communication studies: How frames 
are used in communication has an effect on public opinion of certain objects (cf. 
Chong & Druckman, 2007). Framing is hence closely connected to strategy, 
which is linked to agenda-setting: Having an issue considered by policy-
makers. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) have shown that framing affects 
decision-making. They assert that preferences can change with different 
framings, so that an individual faced with the same problem in a second 
decision can make a contradictory decision to the first one if the problem is 
framed differently. But only if an issue is considered there is a chance that 
decision on that issue will be taken (cf. Princen, 2011). “The dynamics of 
participation in policy-making processes are crucially mediated by institutional 
factors. Policy is made in distinct institutional arenas or, in the terminology of 
Baumgartner and Jones (1993), ‘venues’. Hence, participation depends on the 
venue in which an issue is taken up” (ibid., 929). Furthermore, the decision on 
which venue deals with an issue is determined by the terms in which the issue 
is defined; framed.  
Applying framing to the case of REDD it is worth assessing whether it is 
defined according to the objectives and benefits which aim to be highlighted by 
particular actors. As outlined above, REDD was foremost defined as a climate 
change mitigation mechanism. Hence the venue where it was negotiated was 
dominated by environmental/climate change actors. In this arena it was more 
closely connected to the economic benefits resulting from it. To frame REDD as 
potentially cost effective has arguably been the first predominating reason for a 
large-scale acceptance of the mechanism in the early years (2005-2007). As the 
concept of REDD became more clearly structured and actors had to deal with 
the question of financing the mechanism, framing became more nuanced: In 
particular it was suddenly conceptualised by some actors as a development aid 
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tool with ODA suitable for fast-start financing. This framing was further 
strengthened when it was realised that capacity building in developing 
countries is a major pre-conditions for implementing REDD projects.  
The development of these two major frames (climate change & development) is 
important for this paper as it shows how knowledge can be constructed in the 
most suitable way for an actor. However, to what extent framing is linked to 
uncertainty is discussed later on. It should thus be kept in mind that 
uncertainties and hence also knowledge production can be utilized very 
strategically: As the future outcome of REDD remains uncertain, it might be the 
framing as a development aid tool that could give it a new scope. This is further 
elaborated in the next chapter, where the factors for analysis are introduced. 
4 Factors for Utilizing Uncertainty  
To analyse how uncertainty can be utilized by actors, a model is developed 
consisting of three different factors: Actor-constellation (ac), agenda-setting (as) 
and economic capacity (ec). These factors are based on theoretical assumptions 
considered particularly relevant for the purpose of this paper. These shall be 
briefly outlined. The following function is adopted to illustrate the impact of 
the three factors on utilizing uncertainty (Uu): Uu = f (ac, as, ec) 
4.1 Actor-constellation 
The rationale behind this factor derives from theoretical literature on types and 
patterns of democracy (cf. Lijphart, 1999). In particular the differentiation of 
consensus and majoritarian democracies is taken as an important aspect from 
which the actor-constellation can be derived. Consensus democracies are said 
to have particular advantages when it comes to ‘softer’ political issues, i.e. more 
foreign aid to less-developed countries. In addition, the division of power is 
important. “Constitutional structures, such as federalism-unitarianism 
indicators, and informal characteristics, such as relationships between 
government and opposition parties, may have different effects on policy” 
(Schmidt, 2002). Hence regime types as well as the organisation of the policy 
are important components influencing the particular actor-constellation.  
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For the purpose of this paper it is hence considered important what kind of 
actor-constellation we have and which (institutional) interests are represented. 
This relates in particular also to the representation and inclusion of non-
governmental actors. It is assumed that federal systems allow a better 
representation of a variety of interests. As these interests, represented by actors, 
must be considered the decision-making takes longer but might also last for 
longer. Applied to REDD the following hypothesis is derived:  
The more consensual and decentralized the system, the more diversified the actor 
constellation, the higher utilizing of uncertainty (Hac) 
Adapted to the function this would mean: ac+  Uu+ 
4.2 Agenda-setting 
The selection of agenda-setting as another factor for analysis derives from 
leadership literature. Literature on leaders and leadership is manifold, in 
particular concerning the role international institutions, organisations and 
international regimes (cf. Young, 1991, Underdal, 1994). Young and Underdal 
have developed four types of leadership: intellectual leadership, instrumental 
leadership, power-based leadership and directional leadership. Common to 
approaches of leadership is the reference to certain behaviours which 
individuals display or activities they undertake (Selznick, 1957). Hence 
leadership “is the persuasion of individuals and innovativeness in ideas and 
decisionmaking [sic] that differentiates leadership from the sheer possession of 
power” (Hall, 1996: 141). “According to the Dictionary of Political Analysis, 
leadership is what ‘enables an individual to shape the collective behavioural 
pattern of a group in a direction determined by his or her own values’” 
(Andresen & Agrawala, 2002: 41f.). Andresen and Agrawala have analysed 
leadership in relation to the climate regime which is an important point of 
departure for this analysis.  
What is, however, in particular important is that leadership is here considered 
as the framework for both agenda-setting and also framing of an issue. A 
relatively novel issue that has not previously been considered by policymakers 
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needs strategic intervention and has to be placed in a venue in which it can be 
constructively discussed. If an issue is defined and knowledge on an issue is 
established this often implies that venues are occupied and limited space for 
influencing the formulation process and agenda-setting might available. 
Applied to REDD the following hypothesis is derived:  
The higher previous knowledge and occupied venues, the less influence and possibility 
for utilizing of REDD (Has) 
Adapted to the function this would mean: as+  Uu- 
4.3 Economic capacity 
This factor is less theory based than the previous two but considered essential 
for analysis. In particular as the financial commitment of REDD donors is 
essential for the mechanism at large its overall economic capacity is important. 
Here in particular the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the natural resources 
are important. The following hypothesis is derived: 
The higher economic factors the higher utilizing of REDD (Hec) 
Adapted to the function this would mean: ec+  Uu+ 
These three factors are in the following applied to the case of Norway to come 
closer to the answer How does an actor utilize uncertainty and why? 
5 Utilizing Uncertainty: The case of Norway 
For assessing Norwegian engagement on REDD it should be kept in mind that 
environmental protection has ranked very high on the political agenda since 
1970s while at the same time constantly looking for economic growth. 
Economic interests as well as environmental ambitions are part of the same coin 
for many Norwegian politicians. However, how does this relate to REDD? 
5.1 Actor-constellation on REDD in Norway 
The actor constellations within each country, the distribution of institutional 
responsibility in pursuing REDD, and the specific interests of political actors 
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are considered decisive for shaping the REDD engagement. Before the specific 
actor constellation in the case of REDD is assessed, some more general remarks 
on the political system of Norway: Norway is a unitary parliamentary 
democracy with a constitutional monarchy. It is a centralized system. Currently 
three parties are in coalition and three further parties form the opposition.  
In Norway REDD was announced publicly and included in the Climate White 
paper in 2007/2008. It received widespread political support (with all parties 
but the Progress Party agreeing on the target set out) and Stoltenberg himself 
was very keen to have REDD on the political agenda. In addition, Erik Solheim, 
Minister for Environment and development (until March 2012) promoted 
REDD; an inter-ministerial working group for REDD was established. 
Norwegian REDD engagement was right from the beginning driven by the 
support of NGOs. Rainforest Foundation Norway and Friends of the Earth 
Norway picked up on what was to become REDD even before it was discussed 
in Norwegian politics. It saw the ‘window of opportunity’ to shape REDD 
policy and has since been active in drafting and implementing REDD projects 
in developing countries. There has been no opposition to REDD amongst 
Norwegian NGOs although the number of actively engaged NGOs is limited. 
However, this strategic involvement of NGOs is unprecedented and shows a 
very specific representation of interests, with uncertainty leaving room for free 
maneuvering. With Norwegian REDD money being part of the ODA budget, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in charge of all financial aspects of REDD and 
Norad, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, further 
distributes money for REDD research. At the same time the Norwegian 
Ministry of Environment is in charge of administrating REDD projects. This 
inter-ministerial location indicates REDD in Norway as situated in the area of 
responsibility of both development aid as much as climate change.  
Concerning Hac (The more consensual and democratic the system, the more diversified 
the actor constellation, the higher utilizing of uncertainty) the application to the case 
of Norway has shown that although it is not a federal but a centralized political 
system, many actors are involved when it comes to REDD. However, the 
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political process apart from the very first initiating by the NGOs is very much a 
top-down approach, with Stoltenberg himself being highly engaged. Hence the 
hypothesis is only party verified by this analysis.  
5.2 Agenda-setting on REDD in Norway 
Norway first became internationally recognized for its environmental 
engagement when the Brundtland Commission, chaired by Norway’s Prime 
Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, published its report “Our Common Future” 
in 1987 on the concept of sustainable development. “When the Norwegian 
Parliament discussed a national strategy to follow up the recommendations 
from the Brundtland Commission in spring 1989, the Brundtland government 
proposed a goal of stabilizing CO2 emissions at the national level by the year 
2000” (Lundli & Reitan, 2004: 140). To achieve this goal a CO2-tax was 
introduced in 1991, which served as the main climate policy instrument until 
2007 (cf. Gullberg, 2008). During the negotiations for a Kyoto Protocol Norway, 
in line with the US government appeared strongly in favor of flexible 
mechanisms. Consequently, emission trading became the alternative to a CO2-
tax in Norway as it “allowed them to substitute expensive domestic mitigation 
measures with cheaper emissions reductions abroad” (Bang, 2004: 210). Prime 
Minister Stoltenberg has always advocated emissions trading and he has 
appeared as a leader for securing financial transfers from industrialized 
countries to developing countries. 
This agenda-setting behavior was also exercised by Stoltenberg in 2007, 
pushing REDD forward nationally and internationally. “The Norwegian 
government realized REDD was a field which needed leadership in order to 
kick start the process,” Hans Brattskar, ambassador and director of the 
Norwegian government's International Climate and Forest Initiative. “Norway, 
by making significant initial contributions, could be catalytic in the sense that 
we could start building the international framework needed to make it easier 
for other countries to follow.” Norway has influenced the international agenda-
setting process on REDD, contributing not only financially but also organizing 
conferences and calling for further research (cf. Reimer, 2012). Norwegian 
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action was driven by the belief that REDD was the most effective, and cheapest, 
way to significantly reduce global GHG emissions. However, it was paired with 
the belief that REDD as additional ODA would do something good for the 
world. Hence strategic and altruistic interests were part of the same coin. This 
strategic framing of REDD as a development aid tool has had a large impact on 
the overall conceptualization of the mechanism and also the acceptance at 
home. It also implies that a new venue was found through which further action 
could be exercised.  
Applying Has (The higher previous knowledge and occupied venues the less influence 
and possibility for utilizing of REDD), the assessment has shown opposite results. 
Although the hypothesis has been falsified the overall importance of the 
agenda-setting process is immense. As REDD was unknown a new niche was 
occupied by early Norwegian action. This also meant that room for framing 
was given and Norway was able to utilize uncertainty on REDD in the way that 
with ODA it provided a new framework for financing provided different 
incentives for engagement. It was also possible for the Norwegian government 
to purposefully influence the knowledge construction process by 
commissioning reports and studies on the overall framework of REDD. 
5.3 Economic capacity for REDD in Norway 
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Norway in 2011 had the 
highest Gross Domestic Product (GDP) with USD 501.582 billion. This means a 
GDP per capita of 99.66, the world’s fourth highest. So far Norway has spent 
USD 277.09 million on REDD, which is a benign amount considering the overall 
wealth of the country. The countries’ wealth comes largely from the petroleum 
(oil and gas) sector. Economic interests and further development rank high in 
Norway and in particular the petroleum sector has a significant share in 
Norwegian economic uprising since the first oil field was exploited in the 1970s. 
“In 2010, the petroleum sector represented 21 per cent of the country’s total 
value creation. Value creation in the petroleum industry is more than double 
that of land-based industry, and about 15 times the total value creation in the 
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primary industries” (Ministry of Petroleum & Energy, 2011: 22).3 At the same 
time 30 per cent of Norwegian CO2 emissions in 2009 originated from 
petroleum activities (ibid); the largest share of the overall GHG emission of 50.8 
million tonnes (CO2 equivalents) in 2009 (Statistics Norway, Climate and 
Pollution Agency ). However, the decrease of 2008 and 2009, according to the 
Climate and Pollution Agency (Klif) directly linked to the financial crisis, was 
followed by a new increase of 4.8 per cent in 2010, amounting for 53.7 million 
tonnes CO2 equivalents, of which 13.8 million tones are produced by oil and gas 
extraction (cf. Klif).  
“According to Norway’s commitment under Kyoto Protocol, emissions shall 
not be more than one per cent above the 1990 level in the period 2008-2012, 
taking trade with quotas, joint implementation and/or the clean development 
mechanism into account” (Klif). However, emissions rose by around 11 per cent 
from 1990 to 2007 and were 2 per cent above 1990 levels at the beginning of 
2010. The significant increase of greenhouse gas emissions in Norway is closely 
linked to the economic development and hence a significant increase in energy 
consumption. These figures clarify; Norway is dependent in international 
cooperation to achieve its emission targets in particular if the government 
intends to stick to the reduction of GHG emissions of 40 per cent of its 1990 
emissions by 2020 and even become carbon neutral by 2030, albeit depending. 
Concerning Hec (The higher economic factors the higher utilizing of REDD) the 
above presented figures indicate a correlation of economic capacity and 
financial activities. Hence the hypothesis is verified. Despite uncertainties 
attached to REDD this does not seem to have any negative impact on financial 
commitments. It can be assumed that the need for CO2 reductions and the 
availability of large scale funding for a mechanism such as REDD provide large 
scope of action.  
                                                 
3 At the same time the value creation amounts for more than 500 billion Norwegian kroner, according to 
National accounts, Statistics Norway and the State receives a considerable income from petroleum 
activities, which is transferred into the Government Pension Fund – Global (SPU), which in 2010 totalled 
approximately NOK 186 billion with a total value of NOK 3 077 billion. The SPU was established in 1990 
to ensure a long-term perspective for the Government’s petroleum income. It now corresponds for NOK 
600 000 for every Norwegian. 
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6 Discussion 
Assessment of actor-constellation, agenda- setting and economic capacity have 
shown that in the case of Norway these factors can seen as influencing REDD 
engagement. Scope of uncertainty is utilised for action, and hence becomes a 
motor for progress on REDD. This is in particular connected to the framing of 
REDD via co-benefits, mainly as a development aid tool. Uncertainty is neither 
mentioned nor can be identified as a hindering force. Quite the opposite: We 
see a window of opportunity for action on REDD. In particular the knowledge 
construction process in strategically employed by the Norwegian government 
to be perceived as a leader on REDD. 
While Norway is considered as a leader on REDD, Germany is considered more 
of a follower and Canada is perceived as a laggard due to their limited financial 
commitment to the REDD mechanism. The USD 41 million donation to the 
World Banks FCPF is only a very small amount. However, Canada as well as 
Germany show very similar pre-conditions for engagement in REDD as 
Norway. Both countries have a similar economic capacity: They are highly 
industrialized and have a high GDP. Canada even has natural resource richness 
as well as a high per capita CO2 emission. The fact that they do less on REDD 
leaves room to suggest that it does not only depend on high economic capacity 
but for it to be extremely high to give large financial contributions to a 
mechanism such as REDD. Uncertainty is not utilized but could be a hindering 
factor.  
Similarly the actor-constellation: Both Canada and Germany are federal states. 
This could have a negative impact on utilizing uncertainty. However, in 
Germany the early reluctance on REDD is loosened and a broader set of actors 
and interests included in the discussions on REDD. In addition, in Canada 
NGOs are definitely not included in the decision-making process on REDD. In 
Germany the actor-constellation is unclear, indicating the involvement of 
NGOs but at the same time the policymakers keep their official involvement 
limited.  
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The agenda-setting factor shows in Canada a very different set of policy 
priorities of the government. It even looks as if any ambition on environmental 
leadership that Norway, Germany and Canada had in common during the first 
two decades of international environmental negotiations is purposefully given 
up by Prime Minister Stephen Harper. Not even framing REDD as a 
development aid tool seems to be of any interest. In Germany it is a more 
nuanced picture and in particular the Ministry of Environment is active on the 
ground, in developing countries, to improve the knowledge on REDD. 
Although a detailed analysis of Canada and Germany is still missing, 
preliminary testing of the model developed for utilizing uncertainty is 
suggested to give explanations to different engagement in REDD. Norway as 
the first test case has shown that uncertainty can indeed be utilized to provide 
scope for action and in particular influence the framing of REDD at large. 
Hence knowledge on REDD is constructed to suit the needs of the actor. 
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